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Status and Contract In Feminist
Legal Theory of the Family:
A Reply to Bartlett
JANET L. DOLGIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A well-intentioned and influential branch of
feminist jurisprudence is often informed-and
plagued-by its ambivalence about two essentially ideological' concerns: the extent to which
biological differences between men and women
should determine their respective fates before the
law; and the value of the traditional family as an
institution grounded in relations of status.
Although nothing necessitates that these concerns
be linked (since no inevitable correlation exists
between biologically-based gender differences and
choices regarding the form of the family), the theorists in question have insisted upon linking
them-without understanding the danger of doing so. In consequence, they have unwittingly
harmed their own cause.
*Associate Professor, Hofstra Law School; B.A., Barnard
College; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Princeton University
(anthropology).
I am grateful to my colleague Andrew
Schepard for his insightful critique of an earlier draft of this
essay.
1. Ideology, as used here, means, not a system of political
beliefs, but the basic cultural assumptions that lie beneath a
society's reactions to and view of reality. The definition follows
that of the French anthropologist, Louis Dumont, who wrote:
"Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not
a distinction of matter but one of point of view. We do not take
as ideological what is left out when everything true, rational or
scientific has been preempted. We take everything that is
socially thought, believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it
is a living whole, the interrelatedness and interdependence of
whose parts would be blocked out by the a priori introduction
of our current dichotomies."
L. DUMONT,
FROM
MANDEVILLE

TO MARX: THE GENESIS AND TRIUMPH OF

ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY 22 (1977).
2. S. de BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX, xv (1953).

The danger resides in the specious arguments
from biological determinism which for millennia
have justified the oppression of women. As is well
known, women have traditionally been understood through cultural renderings of their biological selves. The "peculiarities" of female biology
have been used to "imprison [woman] in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her
own nature." 2 The biological argument, thus perverted, has been so compelling, so strong, and so
oppressive to women for so long, that feminists
should invoke it (if at all) only with supreme caution, and with total consciousness of its cultural
history, and therefore, of its potential consequences. Otherwise, the danger that the argument may be turned against them is obvious and
grave.
3. It is relatively easy to slip from a position that women are
different from men (biologically, historically, culturally) to one
which grounds all differences in biological inexorabilities.
For instance, in her extraordinarily successful book, In a
Different Voice, Carol Gilligan argued that women, unlike men,
viewed themselves as essentially connected to others and that
this difference accounts for differences in morality, cognitive
function, aesthetic sesibility and psychological growth. C.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Whether Gilligan
has described a "feminist" or a "feminine" approach can be,
and has been debated. See, e.g., Sherry, Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV.
543, 584-91 (1986) (a sympathetic account of Gilligan's work
that regards it as an exposition of "feminine" morality and
thinking rather than feminist theory); Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989) (criticizing Gilligan for
the vagueness of her use of the term "feminine" from a feminist
perspective). In either case however-and particularly if the
characterization is understood as "feminine"-one is all but
compelled to search for the cause and basis of the postulated
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To this danger the feminists in question seem
almost entirely blind. And therefore-for reasons
to be discussed-in their effort to effect desirable
social and jurisprudential change, they have resorted to the inevitable dictates of nature in arguments intellectually naive, and inimical to their
own laudable interests.
Their work is typified by a recent article on
family law by Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood.' Bartlett's explicit goals are impressive. Unfortunately, however, since her resort to biological imperatives is essentially
uninformed, her article undermines her own intentions and the cause she wishes to serve.
Bartlett proposes a thorough revision of current American family law relating to custody disputes in particular, and, more generally, to family
relations, arguing that such law is essentially oppressive, especially to women.
Bartlett presents her case through the use of
three examples:
single women choosing
nonmarital motherhood; unmarried mothers
choosing to place their children for adoption; and
surrogate mothers deciding to keep their children.
In Bartlett's opinion, the laws regulating such
cases reflect an ideology of parenthood "which is
undesirable" because "grounded in notions of exchange and individual rights" that implicitly encourage "parental possessiveness and selfcenteredness." These she proposes to replace
with "notions of benevolence and responsibility. . .intended to reinforce parental dispositions
toward generosity and other- directedness.", 5 To
that end, together with a critical analysis of current law, Bartlett offers an ethical rationale for a
comprehensive program of change in addition to
the program itself. Her program involves replacing a view of family law based on rights with one
based on responsibility.
As opposition to oppression and the effort to
replace self-centeredness with generosity seem
self-evidently and equally impressive, the impulse
that underlies Bartlett's article merits respect.
Unfortunately, however, her argument is not ade-

quate to the impulse, being ultimately unpersuasive for three basic and related reasons. First,
Bartlett fails to situate her analysis of current law
in an historical context and thus fails to recognize
the ideological roots of the socio-legal complex
upon which she focuses. Second, and in consequence, she misinterprets the ideological basis of
current law, failing to recognize within it fundamental contradictions and tensions. The most
fundamental of these contradictions is that between status and contract; between a world based
on set roles and biological certainties and one
based on negotiation and choice. Third, and once
again in consequence, she offers a program of
change not only amorphous and vague, but undermined by an essential danger to her deepest
commitments-a danger she apparently fails to
comprehend, the danger of invoking biological inexorabilities to serve specific ends without recognizing that invocation ultimately supports the
forms of oppression she hopes to obliterate.
This comment begins by describing the historical context that Bartlett neglects; correlatively, the comment presents and analyzes the
ideological foundation of current family, including custody law. The comment then reviews
Bartlett's program of change, describing the danger that lies beneath her suggestions. In short,
this comment presents an alternative reading of
current family law to the one offered by Bartlett.
This alternative reading is based on an analysis,
both historical and sociological, of the ideology
underlying the laws in question and suggests that
family law should be structured to foster carefully
regulated evolution toward the use of contract
without destroying the better aspects of status.
More importantly, family law should not, though
Bartlett ultimately suggests that it should, be
grounded in biology and "status."

distinction between a feminine and a masculine perspective.
The real biological differences that exist between women and
men can ease an unwary theorist toward a biological
explanation, one that understands gender differences as
inexorable, because natural. As Joan Williams has written,
"Gilligan's inconsistent signals of whether she is talking about
women or 'the feminine' have left relational feminism with the
potential to be used as a weapon against women." Williams,
supra, 87 MICH. L. REV.at 813 (1989).

Thus, the danger that this article analyzes in the context of
one author's work-the danger of grounding "feminism" in
biological determinism-is a danger to which much "feminist"
and "feminine" thinking is liable to, and does, fall prey.
4. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293
(1988).
5. Id. at 294.

II. THE SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL
CONTEXT
Bartlett describes contemporary family law
to encapsulate a world of barter and negotiation,
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a world of entitlement and correlative obligation.6
She proposes, in effect, replacing that view of law
and of the family with one attuned to the significance of relationship and responsibility. 7
She asserts that family law has long been
based in the notion of rights, rather than responsibility,8 and that her suggestions constitute an innovative view of the family and of family law. In
fact, her suggestions represent and harmonize
with a view of the family much older, more
deeply entrenched, and more oppressive toward
women than the view she describes as the established one.9
A. Status and Contract: The Law's
Ambivalence
Contemporary family law is not empowered
by a view of the family focused on "exchange and
individual rights." Rather, it is empowered, at
present, by a dynamic tension between, and ambiguity about, a view of the family focused on exchange and negotiated rights and a view of the
family focused on a set of connections (e.g., commitment, loyalty) akin to what Bartlett calls responsibility.
The tension in present family law stems precisely from the historical process in which rights
have begun to replace responsibility (to use Bartlett's terms)."0 Thus, in order to comprehend the
present situation, it is essential that the historical
process be understood.
Current understandings of the family, and of
family law, can be contextualized historically and
sociologically in light of a fundamental shift, described by Sir Henry Maine more than a hundred
years ago, from a universe based on relations of
status to a universe based on relations of contract."
Maine wrote:
The movement of the progressive
societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been
distinguished by the gradual dissolution
6. See id. at 295.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 295-297. "Since the earliest days of the modern
liberal state, parenthood has been expressed in terms of
exchange." Id. at 297.
9. Id. at 299.
10. See infra text at notes 11-28.
11. See Dolgin, Status and Contract in Surrogate
Motherhood: An Illumination of the Current Surrogacy Debate,
38 BUFF. L. REV. 517-23 (1990).

of family dependency and the growth of
individual obligation in its place. The
individual is steadily substituted for the
Family, as the unit of which civil laws
take account.12
Maine described a process involving the substitution of the autonomous individual, putatively
equal to any other individual for the group and
for relationship,as the basic unit of value in modem society. The modem world imagines the individual to be free to enter agreements-and back
out of them at a price-and free to sell his or her
labor power in the marketplace. The links that
connect people in such a world differ radically
from the ties between people in a world where the
group, not the individual, is primary.
Maine continued:
Nor is it difficult to see what is the
tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have
their origin in the Family. It is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of
history, from a condition of society in
which all the relations of Persons are
summed up in relations of Family, we
seem to have steadily moved towards a
phase of social order in which all these
relations arise from the free agreement
of Individuals. 3
In contrast to a world of contract, Maine posed a
world of status. 4 In a world based on status relations, people are born to be who they are. In such
a world, the inevitable dictates of nature 5 ground
social relations in an absolute reality. In such a
world, rights and duties are fixed at birth and attend relationships understood as natural.' 6
Maine said it well:
All the forms of Status taken notice
of in the Law of Persons were derived
from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family. If then
we employ Status, agreeably with the
12. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 99 (1972).
13. Id. at 99.
14. See also C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL
OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:

THEORY
HOBBES TO LOCKE 49-51

(1962).
15. The phrase, "the inevitable dictates of nature," is used
here to refer to an ideological stance and does not imply
abstract, inexorable truth.
16. See Dolgin, supra note 11, at 517.
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usage of the best writers, to signify these
personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such conditions as
are the immediate or remote result of
agreement, we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status
to Contract.17
The movement from status to contract is a move
from inherent value to market value.'" Lewis
Hyde, differentiating gifts from commodities, describes a gift as having "worth." Its particular,
inherent character precludes a gift's being exchangeable for other equally valuable things. 9
Gifts are bridges. They bond people together.
They make sense in and of a world of status.2°Commodities separate people. They neither
rely on nor activate relationships. Correlatively,
in moving from status to contract, society moves
from a world in which relationships are grounded
in absolute views of reality, both natural and supernatural, to one in which reality is viewed in
relative terms. For instance, the relationship between a mother and her child has traditionally
been comprehended as flowing inevitably from
the biological links between the two. An ideology of status establishes the relationship as inevitable and absolute.2 ' In distinction, market relations" are neither inevitable nor securely
anchored. They are alienable. In substituting
contract for status, society substitutes freedom for
security and choice for familiarity.
In the contemporary world, relations based
17. MAINE, supra note 12, at 100.
18. "Market value" refers, most generally, to that aspect of
value called "exchange value." The term connotes the whole
collection of economic, social and ideological relations that
developed with and through capitalism, B. OLLMAN,
ALIENATION 183 (1971), and can thus describe notions "of self
and self-identity" as well as types of "production and market
processes." S. BARNETT & M. SILVERMAN, IDEOLOGY AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 35 (1979).
19. Gifts sometimes are exchanged for other valuable things,
but to the extent that they are, they begin to take on the form of
commodities and stop being gifts. L. HYDE, THE GIFT:
IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 60 (1979).
20. Obviously, gifts continue to exist in a world largely
defined in contractual terms. They thus exist as pockets of
status in a world largely understood in different terms.
21. Even in a universe based on status, variation and play
emerge.
Relationships
are,
however,
comprehended
ideologically in such a universe as inevitable and absolute. See
note I supra.
22. See note 18 supra.
23. See Dolgin supra note 11, at 519.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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on contract predominate over those based on status.23 However, in a few areas of life, status pre-

dominates. In these areas-preeminently the
family-relations of status are supposed to be primary.2 4 Parents are supposed to care for their
children because love, not money, is involved.25

In relations between family members and good
friends, people are supposed to exhibit commitment and loyalty. They exchange gifts, not commodities, envision their relations as permanent,

not alienable, and often assume hierarchical
rather than egalitarian relations.26
This description harmonizes with Bartlett's

"concept of responsibility" and contrasts with the
rights dimension of present law. Bartlett insists
that "responsibility and relation are difficult
terms to pin down," but she fails to explain why
that is so. "Responsibility" and "relationship"

appear to Bartlett hard to define with specificity
because the central meaning of these concepts demands flexibility. As the anthropologist, David
Schneider, wrote, "... all of the symbols of American kinship seem to 'say' one thing; they provide
for relationships of diffuse, enduring solidarity." 27

Implicitly, Bartlett recognizes this when she defines responsibility, in connection to parenthood,
as involving an identification with, and "commit-

ment to, how the child 'turns out'

,,28

and as being

"derived within a social context that defines ideal
roles for persons engaged in particular relationships.",29 Maine's concept of status entails precisely this combination of ideal roles and commit26. The anthropologist David Schneider has characterized
the American family as enjoying "diffuse, enduring solidarity."
Schneider wrote:
.. all of the symbols of American kinship seem to 'say'
one thing; they provide for relationships of diffuse,
enduring solidarity. 'Diffuse' because they are functionally
diffuse rather than specific in Parsons' terms. That is,
where the 'job' is to get a specific thing 'done' there is no
such specific limitation on the aim or goal of any kinship
relationship. Instead the goal is 'solidarity,' that is, the
'good' or 'well being' or 'benefit' of ego with alter.
Whatever it is that is 'good for' the family, the spouse, the
child, the relative, is the 'right' thing to do. And
'enduring' in the generalized sense symbolized by 'blood';
there is no built-in termination point or termination date.
Schneider, Kinship, Nationality and Religion in American
Culture.- Toward a Definition of Kinship in SYMBOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER IN THE STUDY OF SYMBOLS AND
MEANINGS 67 (J. Dolgin, D. Kemnitzer & D. Schneider eds.
1977).
27. Id,
28. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 300.
29. Id. at 299.
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ment, understood consciously by Maine, and less
consciously by Bartlett, as grounded in the nature
of relationship.
Bartlett errs decisively in asserting that our
present family law system emphasizes rights to
the relative exclusion of responsibility.30 Her mistake is predictable. The notion that family members have rights vis-a-vis one another is newly important. Perhaps, because family law has
traditionally been defined through the notion of
responsibility based on relations of status, and because the development of rights analyses within
family law has occurred amidst much sound and
fury, rights analyses within family law often appear to predominate over those based on notions
of responsibility and status.
In fact, rights are typically invoked when the
family, comprehended as a community of responsibility, fails to operate. When the family founders, state intervention is invoked to delineate applicable rights. But, the delineation and
application of rights by the state assumes the family to be a community of status-based relationships.
Because Bartlett sees current family law as
involving contract, rather than as contract and
status arguing their respective cases, she fails to
notice the deep-seated presence of status in current family law, in general, and in custody law, in
particular. Present law, like the society it reflects,
assumes that the family is and should remain primarily a universe defined in status terms, a universe of love, not money, of commitment, not negotiation, of relationship, not autonomy.3 '
Within family law, rights must be articulated be-

cause on the whole, the system has traditionally
assumed that the family is an arena in which
one's obligations and privileges stem from inherent personal characteristics (e.g., sex).32 The articulation of rights in family law is, in part, an
innovation capable of protecting the weaker party
in status-based, hierarchical relationships.
For instance, in her analysis of a set of constitutionally based rights such as the right to procreate,33 the right to have an abortion, 34 and the
right to raise one's children, 5 Bartlett condemns
the law's "single-minded focus on the rights of individuals., 3 6 But no such focus exists. In the first
place, the law continues in great measure to assume that the family represents primarily a world
of status, not contract. The rights to procreate
and to raise one's children, for instance, assume
that relationship is fundamental to personhood."3
Secondly, as Bartlett herself repeatedly indicates,
the collection of rights that she reviews is, in context, more frequently self-contradictory than harmonious. 3a These rights do not stem from, and
do not reflect, a single minded view of reality.
The contradictions that Bartlett's review demarcates do not, as Bartlett would have us believe,
indicate the failure of law to appropriate models
based on the concept of responsibility. Rather,
they indicate the law's ambivalence about the
movement from status to contract, an ambivalence which brings a useful wariness and moderation to current efforts to amend family law. 9
Bartlett interprets constitutional rights-particularly those based in the right to privacy-as
further evidence that the law understands the
family as it does the market, as an arena in wbich

30. Id. at 294.
31. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d
106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (upholding contract between
cohabitants pertaining to distribution of property and support
payments yet characterizing cohabitants involved in status
terms). The Marvin court wrote:
The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically
in regard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard
based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently
been so widely abandoned by so many. Lest we be
misunderstood, however, we take this occasion to point out
that the structure of society itself largely depends upon the
institution of marriage, and nothing we have said in this
opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution.
Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
32. See, e.g., Schepard, Taking Children Seriously:
Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV.
687, 699 (1985) (describing development of economic model for
spousal relations as response to demands for gender equality in
marriage).

33. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 309, 321.
34. Id. at 320.
35. Id at 321.
36. Id. at 305.
37. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972)
(unwed fathers who "care about the disposition of their
children" have constitutional right to hearing in custody or
adoption proceedings).
38. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 4, at 311, 316, 330.
39. The law's ambivalence about the move from status to
contract is dramatically illustrated by the confused and
contradictory positions taken with regard to the correlative
rights of minors and their parents. Compare Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding unconstitutional Massachusetts
statute requiring parental consent for minor girl to get an
abortion) with Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (parents
have right to admit their minor child to mental institution).
The two cases were decided in the same term. In neither case
did the Court address the contradiction between the holdings.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER

autonomous individuals have the right to negotiate reality. In fact, the Supreme Court, both in
privacy rulings and in other related rulings,' has
been ambivalent about welcoming relations based
on contract, in Maine's sense, into the domain of
the family.
A key to Bartlett's confusion is found in her
reference to Catherine MacKinnon's assertion
that "'[t]he law of privacy works to translate
traditional social values into the rhetoric of individual rights as a means of subordinating those
rights to specific social imperatives.' ,4I

Privacy

law often operates as MacKinnon claims. However, the traditional social values to which she refers are largely status-based. These values are reflected in the law of privacy as applied to the
family, which is thus conservative, and therefore
reluctant to protect the admission of contractbased relationships into the arena of family matters because privacy law is grounded in "traditional social values." "[T]he rhetoric of individual rights" (MacKinnon's phrase) may mask,
may challenge, but has not yet usurped, status.
Privacy rulings, as Bartlett recognizes, offer only
reluctant assistance in protecting most non-traditional family forms, not because the law of privacy defines the family in market terms, but because it assumes that the family represents a
world of status, and grows wary when the traditional values associated with that world are
threatened.
B. The Case of Surrogate Motherhood: An
Examination of Bartlett's Thesis
The case of surrogate mothers, deciding to
retain or seek custody of the baby born as a result
of a surrogacy agreement, is one of the three examples Bartlett employs to illustrate her criticisms of family law. The example is especially
powerful because surrogacy arrangements bring
an actual contract, replete with attendant rights
40. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (demarcating a "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter"); Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 0973)
(holding constitutional a zoning ordinance restricting
occupancy to one-family units on grounds that it encourages
"family needs" and "family values.") Id. at 9. The ordinance
defined family as "[o]ne or more persons related by blood,
adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants." Id. at 2;
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
0974) ("This Court has long recognized that freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
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and obligations, into the center of the parentchild relationship.
Bartlett suggests that legal responses to the
dilemmas posed by surrogacy should not focus on
rights (e.g., the right to adopt, to procreate, to retain a parental role) or on "fairness and equality
for the parents," but on a "demonstration of responsibility and commitment to the quality of the
[parent-child] relationship." 42
The so-called Baby M case, involving an actual contract, negotiated and signed by the biological parents, provides strong ground for examining Bartlett's central thesis. The case, involving a
custody battle between Baby M's biological ("surrogate") mother and her biological father, was
brought by William Stem, the biological father,
who asked the New Jersey courts to enforce a surrogacy agreement between himself, the surrogate,
Mary Beth Whitehead, and her husband, Richard
Whitehead.43 If Bartlett is correct in asserting
that custody law prefers the model of the market,
of rights, of contract, to that of status and responsibility-if, as she insists, "the critical fact is that
surrogacy arrangements, however dressed up," legitimize almost exclusively "bargain and exchange over the incidents of parenthood""-then
the opinions of both the trial court and the appellate court should everywhere reflect primarilyindeed almost exclusively-the underlying assumptions and the language of the autonomous,
self-interested individual involved in commerce.
In fact, however, the judicial opinions in the
case represent antagonistic conceptions of the law
controlling surrogacy. The trial court upheld the
surrogacy contract, terminated Mary Beth Whitehead's parental rights, and immediately allowed
William Stem's wife, Elizabeth to adopt the
baby.4 In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme
Court declared surrogacy contracts void and possibly criminal, and reversed the termination of the
biological mother's parental rights' and the adopthe liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.")
41. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 310 n.72 (quoting C.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 97 (1987)).

42. Id. at 336.
43. See Dolgin, supra note 11, for detailed analysis of the
Baby M case in light of the differences between status and
contract.
44. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 332.
45. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128
(1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d
1227 (1988).
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tion of the baby by Elizabeth Stem. Beneath
these differences, however, the two opinions share
a set of ideological assumptions: that, in short,
the demands of the marketplace must give way
before the sacred demands of the family, understood in status terms."
The trial judge, who appeared to uphold the
surrogacy contract, in fact began his opinion by
asserting that the child's best interests constituted
the primary issue in the case and that "[a]ll other
concerns raised by counsel constitute commentary."
For the trial court, the contract was a
deus ex machina, appropriated to effect the ends
of status and responsibility. The trial judge saw
the court as creating a family for Baby M. Judge
Sorkow wrote for the court:
When [Baby M] was born on
March 27, 1986, there were no, attendant to the circumstances of her birth
[sic], family gatherings, family celebrations or family worship services that
usually accompany such a happy family
event. The facts found by this court...
tell quite a different story.
In reality, the fact of family was
undefined if non-existent [sic]. The
mother and father are known but they
are not family. The interposition of
their spouses will not serve to create
family without further court intervention .. .
Moreover, in Judge Sorkow's view, the family so
created reflected all the advantages of status and
responsibility. He wrote,
This court is satisfied by clear and
convincing proof that Mr. and Mrs.
Stern wanted and planned for this child.
They intended to be parents of the child.
They have a strong and mutually supportive relationship wherein each respects the other and there is a balancing
of obligations. There is proof of a successful cooperative parenting effort.
The Sterns have a private, quiet and unremarkable life which augers well for a
stable household environment.49

The New Jersey Supreme Court's support of
status was more explicit and more consistent than
the trial court's.50 The supreme court ruled that
children cannot be purchased and that contracts
cannot replace "motherhood."'" The court concluded that the surrogacy contract violated New
Jersey statues governing adoption and parental
terminations as well as state public policy. The
court wrote:
This is the sale of a child, or, at the
very least, the sale of a mother's right to
her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the purchasers is the father. Almost every evil that prompted
the prohibition on the payment of
money in connection with adoptions exists here. 52. . .
The surrogacy contract is based on
principles that are directly contrary to
the objectives of our laws. It guarantees
the separation of a child from its
mother; it looks to adoption regardless
of suitability; it totally ignores the child;
it takes the child from the mother regardless of her wishes and her maternal
fitness; and it does all of this, it accomplishes all of its goals, through the use
of money. 3
In short, both courts did precisely what Bartlett says should be done, but, despite the evidence,
denies is done: they resolved the conflict over the
child by deciding "what kinds of children and
families-what kinds of relationships-we want
to have." 5' 4
Thus, on the evidence of the Baby M case,
considered as a unit, Bartlett's thesis, as applied
to current custody law, is discredited. Bartlett
may disagree with the manner in which the concept of responsibility is formulated in the Baby M
opinions. But she may not be permitted, without
challenge, to assert that those opinions argue
from presumptions of contract and rights to the
exclusion--or even significantly to the detriment---of presumptions of status and responsibility.5" The courts and the parties themselves all

46. Dolgin, supra note 11, at 541.
47. 217 N.J. Super. at 323, 525 A.2d at 1132.
48. Id. at 401, 525 A.2d at 1172.
49. Id. at 397, 525 A.2d at 1170.
50. The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that
"[a]lIthough clearly expressing its view that the surrogacy
contract was valid, the trial court devoted most of its opinion to
the question of the baby's best interests. The inconsistency is

apparent." In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 417, 537 A.2d 1227,
1238.
51. 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
52. Id. at 437-38, 527 A.2d at 1248.
53. Id. at 441-42, 527 A.2d at 1250 (footnote omitted).
54. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 303 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 336.
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stressed the overriding need to safeguard the family as an
arena in which relationships are based on
56
status.

III. THE PROGRAM OF CHANGE
Even more unsettling, perhaps, than Bartlett's failure to describe accurately the ideological
assumptions that underlie current family law is
her failure to define clearly the program of change
she herself proposes. Both failures flow, directly
and inevitably, from the insufficiencies of her historical analysis. And the second is, as a practical
matter, more significant than the first, since her
vagueness blinds her to an essential danger inherent in her program-a danger which is clear,
present and grave, the danger that her ultimate
reliance on biological correlates of gender as determinants of legal choice will encourage the very
oppression she opposes.
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connected to the program she fashions. 6 ' Both
difficulties stem from her failure to recognize and
analyze the roots and social character of her central concepts and, consequently, her failure to
perceive that her concept of responsibility is simply a transformation of a very old view of family
relations, a transformation of status, as defined by
Maine.
Basic to Bartlett's program for change is her
invocation of a "mystical bond" between mother
and child, created during pregnancy and childbirth, as a "constructive starting point" for modeling "how we 62
might want parents to feel about
their children.,

she associates with responsibility and connection.
However, she cannot characterize and explain the
values implicit in gift. Responsibility she refers to
as "a certain type of connection that persons may
experience in their relationships with one another.",5 ' And the "connection," she declares, "is
one of identification," which is "positive and affirming," and which "seeks what is good for the
other person."59 All of this, of course, sounds
lovely. But as Bartlett herself seems to realize,
she is unable to sustain the analysis: her concepts, she admits, are difficult to concretize. And
in the end, there is no obvious or logical link between these concepts and the specific proposals
Bartlett offers.
It is no accident that Bartlett's concepts are
"difficult terms to pin down. ' 6° Nor is it accidental that her self-conscious theory is ultimately un-

That bond established, a great deal follows
almost inevitably. The first case Bartlett presents
involves mothers choosing non-marital motherhood without interference from the biological father.63 Recognizing her resolution as primarily a
rhetorical move, Bartlett suggests that in regulating conflicting parental claims between biological
fathers and unmarried women seeking motherhood-by-choice, the legal system should be cognizant of "which connections between parent and
child are most important to validate." 64 When a
choice must be made, she continues, but we are
unable to "attach positive value to the biological
connection of both parents," 65 we may
want to take account of the different degrees of relationship that have been
formed. At the time of childbirth, the
mother's relationship to her child has
developed through pregnancy and childbirth. In contrast, the father's relationship is only a potential one. Affirming
the mother's connection to the child
(rather than her 'rights' or the father's
absence thereof) strengthens the importance of relationship to our understanding of parenthood. 6
The connection to the child on which Bartlett relies is a connection based in nature. Moreover,
Bartlett's characterization of the connection here
belies her own definition of relationship as recip-

56. See supra, text at notes 47-52; Brief on Behalf of
Respondent at 80, In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227
(1988) ("Through surrogate parenthood, traditional family
values are strengthened."); Brief on Behalf of Mary Beth and
Richard Whitehead at 34-55, In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537
A.2d 1227 (1988) (describing mother-child relationship as
grounded in inexorabilities of biology).
57. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 295.
58. Id. at 299.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 298.
61. Bartlett's proposed program for change is connected to
the assumptions-of which she is apparently not fully awarethat underlie her theory. See infra, Sec. III(B).
62. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 333.
63. Id. at 306-15.
64. Id. at 315.
65. Id.
66. Id.

A. Bartlett's Program
Bartlett desires, in general, that the law replace a view (hardly existent, as the evidence
shows) of parenthood based on a cycle of exchange with a view based on a cycle of gift.

7

Gift
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rocal. Claims for the primacy of this relationship
appear real because they are based in natural inevitabilities.
In her second case, involving unmarried women choosing to place their children for adoption
despite the objections of the biological father,6 7
Bartlett offers a similar approach:
[T]he law might begin with a presumption that the mother's actual relationship to the child established during
pregnancy and childbirth makes her decision to place the child for adoption a
responsible one, a presumption which
the father may overcome with evidence
that his plan to keep the child is more
responsible.6"
Here, Bartlett attempts to deny that the predicates of her proposal are natural rather than historical or cultural by using the word "relationship" to describe the mother-child tie. Obviously,
however, the proposal is founded on what Bartlett
herself later describes as "the natural vagaries of
nature [that] give an initial advantage to the
mother." 69
Finally, Bartlett discusses surrogacy with the
example of a surrogate mother seeking to retain
custody of the child and preclude the parental
claims of the biological father.7 ° This is the most
complicated of her three cases from the present
perspective because it so clearly questions the
meaning of mother by separating "motherhood"
into component parts.7 ' Is the "real" mother7 2
the genetic mother, the woman who donates the
egg? Is she the gestational mother, the woman in
whose womb the foetus develops? Or, is she the
contracting mother, the woman who signs an
73
agreement to obtain the dreamed of child?
Curiously, Bartlett virtually neglects the
claims of the contracting mother, analyzing instead the comparative claims of the gestational

Ultimately Bartlett's attempts to lay the
framework for resolving the three cases she
presents becomes an effort, albeit unwitting, to
perpetuate, in more humane forms, a view of society, and therefore of law, as rooted immutably in
eternal nature, and therefore sacred.
Thus, her glance is not, as she imagines, toward a future at present undefined, but to a past
altogether, for her purposes, too rigorously de-

67. Id. at 315-26.
68. Id. at 325.
69. Id. at 336.
70. Id. at 326-37.
71. See Dolgin, supra note 11, at 546.
72. Similar questions could be asked with regard to the
"real" father. However, typically surrogacy agreements do not
differentiate the biological and contracting fathers. It is, of
course, possible for the sperm donor and the contracting father
to be different individuals; then, similar questions arise with
regard to fathers as those that always arise in surrogacy cases
with regard to mothers.
73. Presently, contracting (non-biological) mothers do not
sign surrogacy agreements in the United States in order to

avoid violating adoption statutes. When a biological father
signs such an agreement the contract is arguably valid since the
child is already 'his'; thus; he cannot purchase it. This practice
would change were legislation enacted which excludes
surrogacy from the coverage of statutes prohibiting babyselling.
74. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 336.
75. That Bartlett is willing to rely on "the vagaries of
biology" here despite her own recognition that both parents
may "feel strong instincts toward their children" is precisely the
sort of dependence on nature (status, biology) that cannot be
excused and that will ultimately rebound to the detriment of
women.
76. MAINE, supra note 12, at 179.

mother and the biological father. Here, as elsewhere, Bartlett proposes that the biological
mother is in the superior position because the
"vagaries of nature" side with her. She writes:
As we have seen, custody law applicable
to disputes between unmarried parents
tends to favor a child's mother. When
both parents feel strong instincts toward
their children, it is unfortunate that a
continuing, meaningful relationship between the child and both parents is impractical. When it is, a hard choice
must be made, and should be made not
on the basis of fairness to either parent,
but according to rules that affirm responsible parent-child relationships, giving priority to those that have already
been formed. In many cases, the biological father will be required to accept the
disappointment of his expectations of
parenthood, in the face of the existence
of a parent-child relationship, that,
through the vagaries of biology, will
give an initial advantage to the
mother.74
Bartlett's suggestion reflects precisely
Maine's universe of status,7" in which "personal
conditions" (e.g., sex) establish a person's social
position "irreversibly at birth."76
B. The Dangers of the Program
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fined, and more dangerous to her deepest aspirations than she comprehends.
The essence of the danger-that the ideological universe she invokes may perpetuate the very
forms of oppression she aims to destroy-is illuminated by the anthropologist David Schneider,
in an analysis that harmonizes with Maine's position and provides a useful model for the present
analysis. According to Schneider, the symbols of
American kinship "are all concerned with unity
of some kind."" All of them

seem to say one thing; they provide for
relationships of diffuse, enduring solidarity. 'Diffuse' because they are functionally diffuse... [T]he goal is 'solidarity,' that is, the 'good' or 'well being' or
'benefit' of ego with alter .... And 'enduring' in the generalized sense symbolized by 'blood'; there is no built-in termination point."
It is about the impulse to diffuse, enduring
solidarity that the symbols of American kinship
speak. Moreover, these symbols---especially
those, like blood, that refer to a natural substance--effectively nurture the impulse toward
kinship, in the most literal sense, to fixed, enduring, immutable nature. Such symbols best promote the illusion of an ultimate reality when substantialized, since substantialized symbols79
ground the moral correlates of kinship, thereby
making them appear real and natural. For example, blood between parents and children helps decisively to establish, clearly and irrevocably, 8what
0
"'acting as a parent' or 'as a child' means."
Unfortunately, such positioning can promote
and legitimize exploitation. In fact, for reasons
too complex to discuss here, for millennia, in the
West, one of the intentions of such positioning
has been to do precisely that. 8 Thus, the theory
77. Schneider, supra note 26, at 67.
78. Id.
79. Substantialized symbols (e.g., blood, mud, "the people")
represent the essence of people and their social relations and
symbols
which
contrast
with
contractualized
"involve.. .notions of individuals (more or less) freely entering
into agreements to do certain things in accordance with certain
standards or rules. Contractualized symbolism appears most
clearly in the 'marketplace.'" BARNErr & SILVERMAN, supra
note 18, at 51. Substantialized symbols are the symbols
"involved in ideas such as natural substance." Id.
80. Id. at 190.
81. See

L. DUMONT,

(1970); J. P.

254-57 app.
37-39 (1965).
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82. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872)
(denying women the right to practice law. Justice Bradley,
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of fixed, immutable nature as the ground both of
social custom and of law- the ideology of status,
as defined by Maine-has been used as an argument in support of oppression; and nowhere, perhaps, to more destructive effect than against women, especially in their aspect as mothers.8 2
Their biology, the argument runs, is their fate:
constricted by their unique, immutable intimacy
with nature, in particular with blood, they are
doomed to essential, eternal inferiority. 3
Neither the premise nor the conclusion of
this argument need detain us. But vigilance necessitates that its unwitting appearance in the
minds of its opponents be, at the minimum, noted
with regret. And thus we refer to its presence,
virtually as axiom, in Bartlett.
With depressing consistency, the details of
Bartlett's program for change turn out, on examination, to be grounded in the universe of status;
and, in particular, to lapse into precisely the danger against which Schneider's analysis warns.
Anxious to establish kinship, she appeals consistently to "biological facts," transforms them into
"cultural constructs," and concludes, unfortunately, that such constructs "constitute a model
for commitment. '""

IV. CONCLUSION
In her rush to create a better world, Bartlett
thus falls, as the evidence above shows, unwittingly into the hands of her enemies. At one point
she appears to recognize that the ideology she espouses as a model for the parent-child tie is the
same ideology that has limited women's options
and barred them from the marketplace.8 5 But
everywhere else she fails to comprehend the danger of the responsibility and commitment she
seeks. She fails, in short, to adequately underconcurring, wrote, "[t]he paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother ....
It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe
regulations founded on nature, reason, and experience for the
due admission of qualified persons to professions and callings
demanding special skill and confidence."
83. See United Automobile Workers v. Johnson-Controls,
Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S.Ct. 1522
(March 26, 1990) (No. 89-1215) (upholding "fetal protection"
policy which precluded the company-a battery maker-from
employing "women with childbearing capacity" in jobs
involving exposure to lead).
84. This process of reification can play itself out: next, the
law can transform the "model for commitment" into a
compulsory prescription for behavior.
85. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 333.
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stand that the "mystical bond" she invokes between a mother and her child, as a starting point
for constructing a model of the parent-child relationship, can be, and historically has often been,
used as a shackle, 6 a tool for defining women as
inadequate and incomplete.8 7 In consequence,
she proposes a program of change which, despite
her intentions, looks, not forward into a more equitable, more caring future, but backward, to a
dreary, callous past.
86. See note 81 supra.

No enlightened human being will fail to respect Bartlett's longing for a society grounded in
sensitivity, benevolence, and selfless love-for a
society, in short, in which justice predominates.
But the longing itself is not sufficient. In the absence of rigorous historical and social analysis,
current law cannot be understood, and a workable program of social change cannot be set forth.
Only the adequate discipline of thought can bring
us closer to the heart's desire.
87. See de

BEAUVOIR,

supra note 2, at xv-xvi.

